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In this letter a deterministic secure direct bidirectional communication protocol is
proposed by using the quantum entanglement and local unitary operations on one
photon of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) photon pair.
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After the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984[1], a variety of quantum
secret communication protocols have been proposed( for a review see [2]). Majority of these proto-
cols are nondeterministic[1,3,4]. Only recently, several deterministic secure direct communication
protocols are proposed [5-7]. In all these deterministic protocols, the secret message can only be
transmitted from one party to the other in a quantum channel, i.e., two parties can not simultane-
ously transmitted their different secret messages to each other in a quantum channel. In general,
convenient bidirectional simultaneous mutual communications are very useful and usually expec-
tant. Inspired by the deterministic secure direct protocol (i.e., the ping-pong protocol) proposed
by Bostro¨m and Felbinger [6], in this letter, by using the quantum entanglement of the photon
pair and two local unitary operations on one photon in the pair by different parties in turn, we
propose a deterministic secure direct bidirectional simultaneous communication protocol, which
makes secret timely mutual communication (dialogue) possible in a quantum channel.
The ping-pong protocol allows the generation of a deterministic key or even direct secret com-
munication. A important idea of the protocol is that the secure information is encoded by a local
operation on a photon of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) photon pair, which has already been
raised by Bennett and Wiesner [8]. In this letter, we will further take advantage of this idea to
complete the bidirectional communications. Our idea to use two local operations performed by
different parties to encode their different bits is very important, because in terms of it the other
deterministic secure direct communication protocols using quantum entanglement (e.g., Ref.[7])
can be easily changed into the bidirectional ones besides the ping-pong protocol.
Let us start with the brief description of the ping-pong protocol. Bob prepares two photons in
the entangled state |Ψ+〉 = (|0〉|1〉 + |1〉|0〉)/√2 of the polarization degrees of freedom. He stores
one photon (home photon) and sends the other one (travel photon) through a quantum channel
to Alice. After receiving the travel photon Alice randomly switches between the control mode and
the message mode. In the control mode Alice measures the polarization of the travel photon and
announces the result publicly. After receiving Alice’s result Bob also switches to the control mode
and measures the home photon in the same basis and compares both measurement results, which
should be perfectly anticorrelated in the absence of Eve. Therefore, the appearance of identical
results is considered to be the evidence of eavesdropping, and if it occurs the transmission is
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the Zjt (j ∈ {0, 1}) operation on the travel photon to encode j according to her secret message
and sends it back to Bob, where Z = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|. After receiving the travel photon Bob
measures the state of both photons in the Bell basis to decode the j = 0(1) corresponding to the
|Ψ+〉(|Ψ−〉 = (|0〉|1〉 − |1〉|0〉)/√2) result. The security of the ping-pong protocol has been proven
[6].
Let us turn to our bidirectional communication protocol. We only revise the ping-pong protocol
in a subtle way. When Bob receives the travel photon, he does not perform the Bell measurement
on the photon pair (i.e., the home photon and the travel photon) at once but carry out a
Zkt (k ∈ {0, 1}) operation on the travel photon (or the home photon) to encode k according to
his secret message. Then he performs the Bell measurement on the photon pair in his hand and
publicly announces his measurement results. Since Bob knows which local unitary operation he
has performed on the travel photon, according to his measurement result he can know which local
unitary operation Alice has performed on the travel photon, i.e., he can extract Alice’s encoding
bit (See Table 1). Similarly, since Alice knows which local unitary operation she has performed
on the travel photon, according to Bob’s public announcement she can know which local unitary
operation Bob has performed on the travel photon, i.e., she can extract Bob’s encoding bit (See
table 1). Till now, a deterministic direct bidirectional communication protocol has been proposed.
Table 1. Corresponding relations among Alice’s, Bob’s unitary operations (i.e., the
encoding bit) and Bob’s Bell measurement results on the photon pair. Alice’s
(Bob’s) unitary operations are listed in the first column (line).
Z0t (0) Z
1
t (1)
Z0t (0) |Ψ+〉 |Ψ−〉
Z1t (1) |Ψ−〉 |Ψ+〉
Let us discuss the security of our protocol. Before Bob’s public announcement, the present
protocol is nearly same as the ping-pong protocol, so it is secure for Bob to get the encoding
bit from Alice. Although Bob publicly announces his Bell measurement result, because he has
performed a unitary operation which Eve can not know on the travel photon in his hand, also Eve
can not know which unitary operation Alice has ever performed on the travel photon. Hence, it is
secure for Bob to get the secret information from Alice via our protocol. Now that Eve can not know
which unitary operation Alice has performed on the travel photon and Bob publicly announces his
measurement result on the photon pair, Alice can securely know which unitary operation Bob has
ever performed on the travel photon. So it is also secure for Alice to get the secret information from
Bob. Hence, the present bidirectional communication protocol is secure against eavesdropping.
In fact, since the ping-pong protocol is secure against the eavesdropping, it is obvious that the
present protocol is secure against eavesdropping. Incidentally, the ping-pong protocol is not secure
under Eve’s intercept-measure-resent attacks without eavesdropping [9]. The present protocol is
also not secure under Eve’s intercept-measure-resent attacks without eavesdropping. To fix this
leak, we suggest that randomly both Alice and Bob publicly announce corresponding fractions of
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insecure in a lossy channel, as shown by Wo´jcik [10]. There is some probability that a part of the
secret message might be leaked to Eve. Similarly, the present protocol is also insecure in the lossy
channel. To fix this leak, we still suggest that randomly both Alice and Bob publicly announce
corresponding fractions of their unitary operations to check whether Eve is in the line.
In ping-pong protocol, the dense coding is abandoned in favor of a secure transmission. By the
way, it is said that the capacity of the ping-pong protocol is doubled by introducing the dense
coding and the security is proven after the dense coding [11]. If so, an improvement on the capacity
of the present bidirectional communication protocol is straightforward.
In conclusion, a deterministic secure direct bidirectional communication protocol is proposed by
using the quantum entanglement and local unitary operations on one photon of the EPR photon
pair. As mentioned before, the subtle idea in this letter to use two local operations performed by
different parties to encode their different bits is very important. In terms of the subtle idea we are
improving other deterministic secure direct communication protocols using quantum entanglement.
We will show them elsewhere.
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